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Introduction1
There once was a time, not long ago, when Europe was close to full employment.
In the 1960's and early 1970s, in the halcyon days after the completion of the
recoveries from the devastation of World War II and before the demise of the
Bretton Woods exchange rate regime and OPEC's increases in oil prices,
unemployment rates throughout Europe were generally in the range of two to three
per cent. Occasionally, as in Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark in the late
1960s and early 1970s, they were even lower, in the range of one per cent.2 It
appeared, as Andrew Shonfield proclaimed in Modern Capitalism, that, with few
exceptions, governments had, through indicative planning, increased cooperation
between business, government, and labor, and the application of  Keynesian
principles to macroeconomic policy, overcome the job-destroying effects of
business cycles and recessions.3 Even in Britain, where efforts to institute indicative
planning and closer relations between business and government had foundered on
the tradition of "arms-length government", unemployment in the 1960s and early
1970s was, on average, about two per cent.4
Now, some three decades later and in the wake of the major recessions of
1974-75, 1980-84, and 1991-94, Europe is afflicted with enduring high levels of
unemployment. Throughout the 1990s, the fifteen member states of the European
Union experienced an average rate of unemployment of about 10 per cent, an
almost five-fold increase from the average rate of unemployment in the fifteen
states in the 1960s (See Table 1). Even some five years after the end of the last
major European recession of 1991-94, and despite the sustained recovery in much
of Europe in the last half of the 1990s, the rate of unemployment remained close to
double digits in the EU as a whole and in double digits in the eleven member states
that had moved to the third and final stage of Economic and Monetary Union on
January 1, 1999 and that constituted the "euro-zone". Thus, in June 1999, the rate
of unemployment in the fifteen member states of the EU was 9.4 per cent,
compared to 10 per cent a year earlier, and in the eleven states of the euro-zone it
was 10.3 per cent, compared to 10.9 per cent a year earlier.5
What makes the long-term deterioration in employment in Europe especially
notable, of course, is the fact that it has been far more severe than in other
advanced economies. Thus, as the data in Table 1 indicate, the average level of
unemployment in the United States rose from about five per cent in the 1960s to
about six per cent in the 1970s and about seven per cent in the 1980s, and then
dropped back below six per cent in the 1990s. In Japan, the rate of growth dropped
sharply in the 1970s and again in the 1990s, and the average level of
unemployment rose over time from about one per cent in the 1960s to about threeRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 2
per cent in the 1990s.  In contrast to those patterns, while the decrease in the
decade-long average rate of growth in the EU was only slightly greater than that
experienced in the U.S., and far less than the precipitous decrease that occurred in
Japan, the average level of unemployment in the fifteen states that now constitute
the EU rose far more dramatically than in either the U.S. or Japan, from slightly
more than two per cent in the 1960s to four per cent in the 1970s, nine per cent in
the 1980s, and more than ten per cent in the 1990s. Compared with the other
major developed economies of the world, then, while all of them shared a long-
term deceleration in the rate of growth, Europe has become, to a far greater extent
than either the United States or Japan, a region of high unemployment. However
universal the forces contributing to higher rates of unemployment in the developed
economies, their impact clearly has been especially severe in Europe.6
The sustained recovery in much of Europe in the mid-to-late 1990s, and the
steady, albeit gradual, decline over several years in the rate of unemployment, led
many observers to believe that, with sufficient time, the number of unemployed in
Europe would return to more tolerable levels. However, that optimistic scenario
was called into question as the global financial crisis that began in Southeast Asia in
mid-1997 spread to Japan, Korea, and the rest of Asia in late 1997, then, in the
summer of 1998, to Russia and Ukraine, and then, in early 1999, to Brazil and
other Latin American economies. As the looming global financial crisis cast its
shadow over the European recovery and threatened the well-being of some
European financial institutions and the prospects for European exports, the
possibility arose that the crisis would bring an abrupt end to the recovery and cause
a reversal in the gradual downward trajectory in the rate of unemployment in the
EU.
The possibility that the evolving global financial crisis of 1997-99 would cut
short the European recovery was averted, of course, thanks to the recovery in East
Asia that took hold in the first half of 1999, the European Central Bank's
coordinated reduction in national interest rates in December, 1998 and its
subsequent reduction, in April, 1999, of its benchmark refinancing rate by 50 basis
points, and the pick-up in European manufacturing and exports that was fueled by
the unexpected drop in the value of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar in the first half of
1999.7 By the second quarter of 1999, most of the European economies had
resumed their recovery, and could look forward to continued recovery, and some
further diminution in the rate of unemployment, in the second half of 1999 and into
2000.
Despite the 1999 recovery, however, the rate of unemployment in the eleven
member states constituting the euro-zone remained above 10 per cent, and theRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 3
ECB predicted that it would remain above that level at the end of 2000.8 Some of
the member states, it is true, did experience significant reductions in unemployment
in 1999.  In Spain, for example, the rate of unemployment continued to drop
steadily, as it had in 1997 and 1998, and in the second quarter of 1999 had fallen
to 15.6 per cent, almost four full percentage points below the rate registered a year
earlier and more than eight percentage points below the rate registered in 1994 at
the peak of the 1990s recession.9 But others--most notably, Germany and Italy--
experienced high rates of unemployment that gave little evidence of any significant
drop in the foreseeable future. Indeed, in Germany, despite a marked pick-up in
business confidence, manufacturing orders, and exports in the first half of 1999,
the number of unemployed, seasonally adjusted, increased in six consecutive
months after February and by August totaled some 4,121,000, 10.5 per cent of the
labor force.10 Likewise, in Italy, which continued to experience the lowest rate of
growth in the EU--about 1.3 per cent in 1999--the rate of unemployment remained
mired above 12 per cent.11
This paper examines the enduring problem of high unemployment in Europe.
In the first section, I describe the magnitude and distribution of unemployment in
Europe in some detail. If it is true that Europe, as a whole, has become a region of
enduring high unemployment, it is also true that the levels of unemployment vary
widely across the member states and, within the member states, across both time
and space. Some of the more important bases of variation are noted--in particular,
the differences that exist among the member states of the EU in aggregate levels of
unemployment, employment, and job creation, as well as the differences that exist
among regions within the member states and across Europe and the differences that
exist on the basis of age and gender.
In the second section of the paper, I consider why, notwithstanding the
general upward trend in unemployment throughout Europe in recent decades, some
of the member states of the EU have been more successful than others in creating
large numbers of new jobs and in resisting the upward trend--and, indeed, in a few
instances, have even been able to reduce the rate of unemployment over the long
term. That discussion identifies some of the economic, political, and institutional
factors that, taken together, appear to have enabled some of the member states of
the EU to resist more successfully than others the long upward trend in
unemployment.
The paper concludes with a brief consideration of how the historic advent of
the third and final stage of Economic and Monetary Union, marked as it is by the
assumption by the European Central Bank of sole responsibility for determining
monetary policy in the participating member states, is likely to affect employmentRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 4
and unemployment in the Union. The advent of the third and final stage of EMU,
and the participation of eleven (and, in all likelihood, eventually all fifteen) member
states,12 undoubtedly represents the most significant institutional innovation to have
taken place in Europe over the past four decades, and it has transformed the
institutional context within which economic policymaking in the Union takes place.
Obviously, it is much too soon to know whether, and if so how, this dramatic and
historic transformation will affect the performance of the economies of the
participating member states.  Nevertheless, it is not too soon to ask whether
participation in the third stage of EMU will enable member states to alleviate the
high levels of unemployment they now experience or, on the other hand, will
impede any such efforts in that regard and perhaps contribute to even higher levels
of unemployment throughout the EU.
Unemployment in Europe: The Contours of the Problem
In the early 1990s, most of the member states of the EU experienced a slowdown
in the rate of economic growth and, in some instances, outright recession. As a
result, the aggregate level of unemployment in the EU rose over the course of
several years, as it had in the wake of the synchronized recessions of the mid-
1970s and early-1980s. Thus, whereas the aggregate level of unemployment in the
fifteen countries that are now members was 8.2 per cent in 1991, by 1994 it had
risen to a level of 11.1 per cent.13 After reaching a peak in the early 1990s, the
levels of unemployment edged downward in the wake of improving rates of growth
in the mid- and  late-1990s. But they did so very slowly and unemployment
remained in double digits. Thus, as noted earlier, the aggregate level of
unemployment in the EU as a whole and in the eleven states participating in EMU
remained in the vicinity of 10 per cent in 1999 and was expected to remain in that
vicinity in 2000.14
Unemployment Across Time in the EU and elsewhere
Figure 1 presents the rates of unemployment in the European Union, the United
States, and Japan over the period 1975-97. These data illustrate the extent to which
and the point at which the EU became a region of high unemployment relative to
the other major developed economies. Prior to the late 1970s, Europe was, in the
aggregate, a region of relatively low unemployment, especially when compared
with the U.S. But in the wake of the oil price shocks of the 1970s, the rate of
unemployment in Europe rose dramatically and reached double digits by the mid-
1980s, while the rate of unemployment in the U.S. peaked in the early 1980s and
thereafter moved downward over the long term. During the late 1980s,
unemployment in the fifteen current members of the EU exceeded the level in theRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 5
U.S. by roughly three percentage points. After increasing in both the EU and the
U.S. in the early 1990s, unemployment in the U.S. soon resumed its downward
path in the wake of the prolonged economic expansion of the mid-to-late 1990s.
But in the EU, the rate of unemployment remained very close to the peak
experienced in the 1992-94 period. As a result, in the mid-to-late 1990s, the gap
between the American and European rates of unemployment grew to more than six
percentage points.
Figure 2 presents the unemployment rate in the Union over the period since
1970 along with the annual change in total employment. Not surprisingly, the two
are related; the long-term upward drift in unemployment appears to have been
driven by the three major recessions of the last three decades--those of the mid-
1970s, the early 1980s, and the early 1990s. Especially during the latter two, when
total employment dropped in both instances for three consecutive years (in 1981-
83 and in 1992-94), the result was an increase of several percentage points in the
aggregate EU-wide rate of unemployment, from less than 6 per cent to about 10
per cent in the first half of the 1980s and from less than 8 per cent to about 11 per
cent in the first half of the 1990s.
The upward trend over the long term in the aggregate level of unemployment
in the EU portrayed in Figures 1 and 2 is intriguing for several reasons. For one
thing, the upward drift in unemployment over several decades and the fact that the
aggregate rate of unemployment is higher after each major recession than it was
prior to each recession calls into question whether there is in fact a particular
"natural", or equilibrium, rate of unemployment in Europe. It lends credence,
instead, to those such as Blanchard and Summers (1986), who dispute the notion
of a "natural", unchanging equilibrium rate and find evidence of  hysteresis--the
possibility that the equilibrium level of unemployment is itself changing over time,
in part because of prior levels of unemployment. Second, and related to this, is the
suggestion in the upward trend in unemployment that cyclical and structural
unemployment are not easily  disaggregated and that waves of cyclical
unemployment such as occur in major synchronized recessions result in higher
levels of structural unemployment after the recessions, thereby in effect raising the
"natural" or equilibrium level. Obviously, the more frequent and closely spaced the
major synchronized recessions, the more likely it will be that the level of structural
unemployment will increase over time, whereas the less frequent the major
synchronized recessions, the more likely it will be that the level of structural
unemployment will decrease over time.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 6
There is a third implication to be drawn from the upward drift of aggregate
unemployment in the EU since the early 1970s and the fact that the major
increases occurred in the recessions of the mid-1970s, early-1980s, and early-
1990s. Each of those major recessions derived from processes and changes in the
international economic and geopolitical environments, processes and changes that
were largely exogenous to the EU--that is, largely external to the EU and, for that
reason, largely uncontrollable by the member states.15 For example, the major
recession of the mid-1970s followed, and was to a large extent triggered by, the
American inflation of the late 1960s and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
exchange rate regime, the Yom Kippur War, and OPEC's four-fold increase in oil
prices. Likewise, the major synchronized recessions of the early 1980s were, in
large part, triggered by the effects on oil production and prices of the Iranian
Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War.  And the major synchronized recessions in
Europe in the early 1990s were, in large part, triggered by the upward pressure on
European interest rates that followed in the wake of the increases in German
interest rates--German rates by the late 1980s and early 1990s setting the de facto
floor for European rates within the European Monetary System--which occurred in
the wake of unification-driven increases in transfer payments, government
spending, budget deficits, and the money supply. To some extent, of course, that
increase in rates was endogenous. On the other hand, to the extent they can be
viewed as responses to unification, the German fiscal and monetary policies of the
early 1990s can be viewed as resulting ultimately from the same factors that gave
rise to unification--that is, the upheavals, transformations, and revolutions of 1989
that were, to a large extent, triggered by the European and domestic political policy
of the Soviet leadership in the late 1980s and the decisions of the Hungarian and
Polish Communist leaderships--in the former case, to open the border with Austria
and to let East Germans leave without visas, in the latter case, to negotiate with and
then bring into government representatives of the Solidarity movement--in the
summer of 1989.
While the two most recent synchronized recessions in Europe were, like the
first in the mid-1970s, largely the product of exogenous forces, we should note that
their adverse effects on employment were amplified by EU policy--in particular, by
the impact of recent initiatives in the domain of monetary and exchange rate policy.
In the early 1980s, soon after the creation of the European Monetary System, the
norms that governed German macroeconomic policy--the importance of price
stability and the willingness to deploy a tight monetary policy and an austere fiscal
policy to achieve that objective--were internalized first in the socialist governments
of France and Spain and subsequently was generalized to the rest of the EC, and as
they were the rate of unemployment in both countries, and in the EC as a whole,
increased sharply.16 Likewise, the combined effects of the EMS crisis of 1992-93,RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 7
which, in the absence of a revaluation of the German Mark and a broad
realignment of all of the exchange rates, resulted in several upward shifts of interest
rates, and the commitment in the Treaty on European Union to moving to the third
and final stage of Economic and Monetary Union by 1999 at the latest, which
required member states wishing to qualify for EMU to pursue price stabilization
and the reduction of budget deficits, contributed to the further erosion of
employment in the early 1990s.17
The association between major exogenous shocks, synchronized recessions
within Europe, and the sharp upsurges in unemployment across Europe that
accompanied those recessions suggests that the member states of the EU, both
individually and collectively, may have only limited control over the aggregate level
of unemployment in Europe.  If one views the major upward impulses in the
"natural", "equilibrium", or "structural" level of unemployment in Europe in recent
decades as having derived from exogenous international economic and geopolitical
shocks, then whether the EU will experience a diminution or worsening of
unemployment in the foreseeable future may depend ultimately not so much on
what the EU member states do themselves but, rather, whether they are subjected
to such employment-destroying exogenous shocks in the future and the extent to
which they are able to cushion themselves from such shocks.
Job Creation in the EU and Elsewhere
The data in Figure 2 suggest that the aggregate level of unemployment at any
moment in time can be viewed as the cumulative product of the year-to-year
changes in employment and that changes in the aggregate rate of unemployment
from year to year are the product of unusually large increases or decreases in the
annual rate of change in employment. Put differently, a high rate of increase in
employment, if sufficiently high and if sustained for a sufficient time, will lower the
rate of unemployment while an unusually low rate of increase, or a decrease, in
employment, if sustained over some period of time, will raise the rate of
unemployment.
Table 2 presents decade-long averages since 1960 of the average annual
change in the number of persons employed in the EU, the United States, and
Japan. These data suggest a marked difference between the U.S., on one hand, and
the EU, on the other, in the extent to which new jobs have been created over the
past four decades. Thus, year-in and year-out over the past four decades, the total
number of employed in the fifteen EU member states increased by a very modest
amount--on average, between 0.3 and 0.5 per cent a year in the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s, and not at all in the 1990s. By way of contrast, the total number employedRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 8
increased in the U.S. by roughly 2 per cent a year between 1960 to 1990 and by
1.5 per cent a year in the 1990s. To a large extent, the movement in opposite
directions that one observes in Figure 1 in the rates of unemployment in the EU
and the U.S. since the early 1980s is a result of the different rates of job creation in
the EU and the U.S. over the past two decades.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the cumulative effect of the marked differences in
the rates of job creation in the EU, the U.S., and Japan in recent decades. Figure 3
arrays the number of persons employed over the past three decades. Since 1970,
the American economy has added roughly 50 million new jobs, net of losses, to the
80 million that already existed, an increase of more than 60 per cent. The Japanese
economy added roughly 15 million new jobs, net of losses, to the 50 million that
existed in 1970, an increase of 30 per cent. The EU, on the other hand, added
barely 10 million new jobs, net of losses, to the 140 million that existed in 1970, an
increase of only 7 per cent over the three decades!
As a result of their higher rates of job creation over the past three decades,
both the United States and Japan achieved substantial increases in the proportions
of the working-age population that was employed, whereas in the EU the
proportion actually decreased. Thus, Figure 4 indicates that between 1975 and
1997 the employment rate in Japan increased from about 69 per cent to about 75
per cent. In the U.S., the increase was even greater, from about 62 per cent to
nearly 75 per cent. But in the EU, the employment rate decreased, from about 64
per cent in the mid-1970s to 60 per cent in the mid-1980s, where, with the
exception of a transitory improvement in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it has
remained ever since. Clearly, the high rate of unemployment is only one facet of
the employment problem in Europe. Another equally important aspect of the
problem is its failure, relative to the U.S. and Japan, to create large numbers of
new jobs and, in so doing, increase the employment rate of its working age
population.
Variations in Unemployment and Employment Within the EU
Table 3 presents the levels of unemployment in the fifteen current member states
of the European Union over the period 1961-98.  These data, which are the
standardized measures of unemployment reported by Eurostat and the OECD,
illustrate the sharp increase in unemployment that occurred in most of the member
states--indeed, all but Greece, Luxembourg, Austria, and Sweden--in the decade
after the first OPEC oil shock, as well as the continued erosion of employment that
occurred in almost all of the current member states in the 1980s and 1990s. The
data indicate that the levels of unemployment dropped in most of the memberRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 9
states in the late 1990s. But those decreases have been, for the most part, very
modest, and as a result the levels of unemployment in most countries remain,
despite the economic recovery in the mid-to-late 1990s, close to the historic peaks
registered in the early 1990s. Indeed, in several countries--Belgium, Germany,
Greece, France, Italy, Austria, and Sweden--the levels of unemployment recorded
in 1997 and 1998 exceeded the average for 1991-96. That the rate of
unemployment remained, in the late 1990s, at or close to peak levels for the decade
testifies to the extent to which the capacity to generate employment has
deteriorated in Europe over the long term.
There are, of course, some significant exceptions to the tendency for
unemployment in the EU in the late 1990s to have remained at or close to the
decade-long peaks. In several member states--most notably, Denmark, Spain,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the U.K.--the level of unemployment by
1999 was not only significantly lower than the average level registered in the first
half of the 1990s but lower than the level registered in the late 1980s as well.
Indeed, the levels of unemployment in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and the U.K. in 1998-99 were not only lower than the levels registered in
the late 1980s and early 1990s but also lower than the levels registered in 1974-85
as well! Barring substantial reversals that could, of course, occur in the wake of
future economic downturns, it would appear that, although situated in a regional
context marked by low growth and deteriorating employment, those countries--
above all, Ireland and the Netherlands--were able to create enough new jobs over a
period of years to lower the long-term, non-cyclical, or structural, "natural" level of
unemployment.
Figure 5 presents the levels of unemployment in the EU as a whole and in
selected member states over the period since 1970. These data illustrate the long
gradual upward trend in unemployment in the EU as a whole and in such member
states as Germany, France, and Italy. The lower panel of Figure 5, however, arrays
the data on unemployment for four of the member states--Ireland, Denmark, the
Netherlands, and the U.K.--that reduced unemployment to such an extent in the
mid-to-late 1990s that the rate had dropped below the rate recorded in the late
1970s and 1980s. Especially notable is the drop of some seven to eight percentage
points in Ireland that occurred after unemployment peaked in the vicinity of 17-18
per cent in the mid-1980s and then rose above 15 per cent in the early 1990s. But
the others--especially Denmark and the Netherlands--experienced significant
decreases in the 1990s as well.
As intriguing as the Danish, Dutch, Irish, Portuguese, and British experiences
are--and we shall return later to consider some of the reasons for their relativeRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 10
success in lowering the level of unemployment--they unfortunately represent the
exception rather than the rule. In most of the member states of the EU, and most
of the members of the euro-zone, the current level of unemployment is still at or
above the levels registered in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, the EU as a whole, and
the  euro-zone in particular, remain areas marked by relatively high levels of
unemployment--levels that equal or exceed those registered in 1980s and 1990s and
that remain quite close to the peak levels registered in the 1990s.
If there are substantial differences among the member states of the EU in
levels of unemployment, there are also substantial variations in the level of
unemployment within many of the member states. Figure 6 presents the
unemployment rates in 1997 for the various regions of the member states of the
EU. We note that virtually all of the member states exhibit considerable internal
variation in the level of unemployment (which, among other things, should caution
one against drawing conclusions about unemployment based solely on national-
level averages). In a few of the smaller states--most notably, Austria, Denmark,
and the Netherlands (and Luxembourg, of course)--all of the regions appeared to
enjoy rates of unemployment that are relatively low, as did substantial portions of
northern and northeastern Italy, southern and southwestern Germany, southeastern
England, and northern Portugal.  But in other regions--most notably, southern
Spain, where the rates of unemployment exceeded 35 per cent, southern Italy and
eastern Germany, in both of which unemployment averaged about 20 per cent, as
well as northern Sweden, central and northern Finland, southern France, northern
France, and parts of Wallonia--the unemployment rates were unusually high. The
existence of these geographic concentrations of unusually high levels of
unemployment, alongside concentrations of low unemployment, suggest that
unemployment in Europe depends, to a considerable degree, upon processes of
economic development and underdevelopment that are regionally concentrated--
processes such as the expansion of the service sector (as in the London region, the
Paris region, the Milan region, etc.), on the one hand, and, on the other,
deindustrialization (as in eastern Germany, southern Belgium, and northern France)
or contraction of the primary sector (as in southern Spain, southern Italy, northern
Sweden, and northern and central Finland).
  Turning from the variation across time and space in levels of unemployment
to the variations that exist in rates of employment, Table 4 presents data on the
average annual increase in total employment in the member states of the EU
decade by decade since 1960. These data highlight the substantial differences that
exist among the member states in the average annual rate of job creation (net of job
losses)--differences that are masked by the overall EU-wide rates of change. Thus,
for example, we note that while the aggregate annual rate of net job creation in theRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 11
EU in the 1990s was zero--indicating that, on average, as many jobs were lost as
were created each year of the decade throughout the EU--and while certain
member states--Finland and Sweden, which experienced unusually severe
recessions in the early 1990s, Germany in the wake of unification, and Italy--
experienced significant contractions in employment, several member states
experienced significant increases in employment that ran counter to the EU-wide
trend. Most notably, Luxembourg and Ireland experienced average annual increases
in employment in the 1990s that were altogether exceptional--not only in the sense
of being considerably larger than any previous decade-long average recorded by an
EU member state, but also in being nearly twice as large as the rate recorded in the
United States, the presumed leader and exemplar of job creation! The Netherlands,
and to a lesser degree Spain, also experienced relatively high levels of aggregate job
creation in the 1990s--in the Dutch case, at a rate that was roughly comparable to
the rate recorded in the U.S.
The sustained job creation that occurred in the 1990s in Ireland,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and several other member states stands in marked
contrast not only to the sharp contractions that occurred in Finland, Sweden,
Germany, and Italy but, also, to the relative stagnation in job creation experienced
by Belgium, France, and Britain. Table 5 provides a comparison of the cumulative
effect of those differences in annual rates of job creation during the late 1980s and
1990s. The data in Table 5 indicate that whereas the total number of persons
employed in the EU increased by 7.7 per cent between 1985 and 1991, the number
decreased by some 1.7 per cent between 1991 and 1997. As the data in the
previous table demonstrated, the data in Table 5 make it clear that the aggregate
pattern in the EU, taken as a whole, masks significant differences among the
member states. Thus, for example, while the total number of employed persons
dropped by roughly 8 per cent in Finland and 11 per cent in Sweden, and by 5-7
per cent in Germany and Italy in 1991-97, the number of employed persons
increased substantially in Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands (and Greece).
Indeed, the cumulative increases in Ireland (21.1 per cent) and Luxembourg (16.4
per cent) not only far exceeded those recorded in the other member states but
greatly exceeded, as well, the increase recorded over that period in the U.S. (7.3
per cent). And taken with the increases experienced in the late 1980s, those
increases contributed to an overall increase in the number employed from 1985
through 1997 of 42 per cent in Luxembourg, 29 per cent in Ireland, and 25 per
cent in the Netherlands. By way of contrast, the total number employed in France
in 1997 was only 3 per cent greater than the number employed in 1985. In Italy,
the number employed in 1997 was actually slightly smaller than the number
employed in 1985. And in Finland and Sweden, the number of employed persons
was 8-12 per cent below the number employed in 1985.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 12
Table 6 presents data on the proportion of the working-age population--that
is, persons aged 15 to 64--employed in the fifteen members states of the EU in
1985, 1991, and 1997. These data reveal that, as noted earlier in regard to Figure
4, approximately 60 per cent of the working age population in the EU  was
employed in the period from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s. Indeed, over the three
decades from 1970 to the late 1990s, the employment rate hovered around 60 per
cent, in marked contrast to the employment rates in the United States and Japan
which rose from about 62 per cent to 74 per cent in the case of the U.S. and from
69 per cent to 75 per cent in the case of Japan. Some of the countries--most
notably, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and the U.K.--had markedly higher
employment ratios during much of the period, although the severe recessions of the
1990s in Finland and Sweden resulted in very substantial decreases that brought
them closer to the EU norm. Others, however--most notably, Italy, Spain, and
Greece (but not Portugal)--had relatively low employment ratios and remained
below the EU average throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
What is most interesting, perhaps, about the data presented in Table 6 is the
fact that several of the member states experienced significant increases in their rate
of employment between the mid-1980s and late-1990s. In particular, Belgium,
Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Britain experienced increases of four
percentage points or more, in marked contrast to the decreases that occurred in
Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Finland, and Sweden.
Several of the countries--Belgium, Spain, and Italy--experienced significant
increases from an initial rate that was well below the EU average in 1985. But
several others--the Netherlands, Portugal, and Britain--experienced significant
increases despite the fact that each was already close to or above the EU average in
1985. In the former case, the increases caused the countries to become more like
their EU partners in regard to employment; in the latter case, the increases caused
the countries to become more like their Scandinavian (and Austrian) partners, and
more like the U.S. and Japan in regard to employment.
Gender, Age, and Unemployment
Turning back from employment to levels of unemployment, Table 7 presents the
rates of unemployment in the EU, the U.S., and Japan in 1998, disaggregated by
gender and age. Notwithstanding conventional stereotypes, there appears to be a
much more marked gender division in unemployment in the European Union than
in either the U.S. or Japan. Thus, the rate of unemployment among women in the
EU was roughly three percentage points, or 33 per cent, higher than that of men,
whereas in the U.S. and Japan the rates were nearly identical for men andRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 13
women.18
Table 7 also presents the rates of unemployment in 1998 of t hose in the
active labor force who were under the age of 25. In general, the levels of
unemployment of persons under the age of 25 are twice those of the labor force as
a whole in the EU, a little more than twice as large in the U.S. and a little less than
twice as high in Japan. Thus, in the EU, roughly 20 per cent of those in the labor
force who were under the age of 25 were unemployed. And as with the labor force
as a whole--and, interestingly, again unlike the situation in the U.S. and Japan,
especially that of the U.S. where the rate of unemployment of young women was
lower than that of young men--the rate of unemployment of young European
women exceeds that of young men by several percentage points. Thus, whereas
18.2 per cent of the men under the age of 25 who were in the labor force in the EU
member states were unemployed (compared to 8.6 per cent of all men), 21 per
cent of the women under the age of 25 who were in the labor force (compared to
11.8 per cent of all women) were unemployed.
Table 8 presents the rates of unemployment in the member states of the EU
in 1998, disaggregated by gender and age. What is perhaps most noteworthy, and
indeed sobering, is the high rate of unemployment of the young and, in particular,
of young women. In some countries, more than 30 per cent of those under the age
of 25 who are in the labor force are unemployed, and in some countries, more than
40 per cent of the women under 25 who are in the labor force are unemployed.
Notwithstanding the (relative) success of a few member states such as Denmark,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Austria in keeping the unemployment
rate for the young in single digits and close to the overall rate, in most of the EU
those under the age of 25--especially young women--confront, to a much greater
degree than do their peers in the U.S. and Japan, the prospect and reality of
unemployment. Thus, for example, in Spain, more than 35 per cent of all young
persons, and more than 46 per cent of all young women, in the active labor force
were unemployed in 1998. In Greece and Italy the figures were comparable: In
Greece, 32 per cent of all young persons and 42 per cent of all young women in
the labor force were unemployed; in Italy, 32 per cent of all young persons and 36
per cent of all young women in the labor force were unemployed. (Interestingly,
Portugal deviates markedly from this "southern" pattern, with rates of
unemployment of young adults and young women that were closer to those found
in the central and northern member states). In France, Belgium, and Finland, the
rates of unemployment among young persons were somewhat lower but still very
high: Thus, in France, more than 26 per cent of all young persons in the labor force
and 29 per cent of young women in the labor force were unemployed; in Belgium,
more than 22 per cent of all young persons and 25 per cent of young women were
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women were unemployed.
One possible explanation for the unusually high levels of unemployment in
some of the member states of the EU, and for the unusually high levels of
unemployment among the young, and among young women in particular, might be
the difference in participation rates in the labor force. Perhaps, it might be argued,
those member states with unusually high rates of unemployment have those high
rates because they have unusually high rates of participation in the labor force,
compared with those member states in which the overall rate of unemployment and
the rates of unemployment of young members of the labor force are relatively low.
The data in Table 9 indicate that this explanation, although plausible, is, at
best, correct only for two of the six countries with unusually high levels of
unemployment.  If we consider the member states which had rates of
unemployment in excess of 10 per cent in 1998--Greece, Spain, France, Italy, and
Finland--and those which had unusually high rates of unemployment for young
adults and young women--those five plus Belgium, all of which had rates of
unemployment in excess of 20 per cent among young adults and young women--it
appears that only Finland and France had higher overall rates of participation in the
labor force than their EU partners and markedly higher rates of participation by
women. Belgium, Spain, and Italy all had rates of participation significantly below
those of the EU, as did Greece for women and for its adult population. In those
countries, then, not only is it the case that an unusually large portion of women in
the labor force is unemployed but that the rate of participation by women in the
labor force is unusually low.
Long-Term Unemployment
If unemployment varies across time, space, gender, and age, it also varies in
duration, and, indeed, one of the most problematic aspects of European
unemployment is the fact that a very significant portion of the unemployed have
been unemployed for a long period of time and are, presumably, less likely to
become employed in the future.19 Table 10 presents the proportion of all those
unemployed in 1997 in each of the member states who were unemployed for more
than one year. One observes that approximately one-half of all of the unemployed
in the EU were, at any given time, persons who had been unemployed for more
than a year. (By way of comparison, in the U.S. roughly 10 per cent of the
unemployed are typically unemployed for more than a year). As with
unemployment in general, the experience of long-term unemployment was more
frequent among women than men. And as with the other facets of employment and
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fifteen member states--Denmark, Austria, Finland, Sweden (albeit the latter to a
much lesser extent in recent years), and Britain (in regard to women)--appear to
have been markedly more successful than the others in reducing the number of
persons unemployed for more than a year relative to the total number of persons
unemployed. None of those states, however, approaches the American pattern in
which the long-term  unemployed constitute roughly ten per cent of all of the
unemployed. Among the other, less successful EU member states, in Germany,
Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal the proportion of the unemployed who had
been unemployed for more than one year exceeded 50 per cent, and in Belgium
and Italy the proportion exceeded 60 per cent! In all of those except Ireland, but
especially in Greece and Spain, the proportions of unemployed women who were
unemployed for more than one year exceeded the proportions of unemployed men.
Part-Time and Temporary Employment
One possible explanation for the considerable variation across the member states of
the EU both in the extent of unemployment and the duration of unemployment
may involve the existence of opportunities in some countries but not others for
persons to work in part-time or fixed-term jobs. Table 11 presents data on the
proportion of those who were employed in 1997 who were working on a part-time
basis or on fixed-term contracts. What is especially noticeable, of course, is that
women have much higher rates of part-time employment than men. In the EU as a
whole, and in such member states as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K., more than 30 per cent of all working women
work in part-time jobs. In Sweden and the U.K. the figure exceeds 40 per cent.
And in the Netherlands the figure approaches 70 per cent! In contrast, in several of
the member states with unusually high rates of overall unemployment and
unemployment of young persons and young women in particular--Greece, Spain,
and Italy--as well as in several other member states--Luxembourg, Portugal, and
Finland--the rates of part-time employment are well below the average for the EU.
The data on part-time employment also suggest that in certain member
states--most notably, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, the U.K., and Finland,
all of which have either unusually low levels of unemployment (the Netherlands,
Denmark, the U.K.) or unusually low rates of long-term unemployment (Denmark,
Sweden, Finland)--a relatively large number of men work on a part-time basis.
While the relationships are by no means overwhelming, it would appear that the
existence of opportunities for part-time employment may help to explain why some
member states have lower levels of unemployment among women, lower levels of
overall unemployment, and lower rates of long-term unemployment.20RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 16
The Economic, Political, and Institutional Sources of Employment
Over the last quarter-century, the European Union as a whole experienced a
dramatic upward trend in its rate of unemployment. As the EU enters the twenty-
first century, it does so with a stubbornly enduring high overall level of
unemployment and very high rates of unemployment among certain segments of its
population and regions of its member states. However, not all of the member states
have experienced the general trend toward higher levels of unemployment. Indeed,
some have not only managed to dampen the rise of unemployment but to create
sufficient numbers of new jobs to lower the rate of unemployment over the long
term. Why is that the case? In this section, we shall consider some of the
economic, political, and institutional features that have enabled some of the
European states to resist better than others the long, secular upward trend in
unemployment and, indeed, in some instances to achieve a substantial reduction in
unemployment over the long term.
Table 12 presents several measures of the performance of the EU member
states in regard to employment and unemployment in the 1990s. By comparing
their performances in regard to the level of unemployment, changes in the level of
unemployment, the extent of unemployment among young adults, the extent of
long-term unemployment, the creation of jobs, the extent of employment, and the
change in employment over the past decade, one can assess to what extent and in
what aspects of employment each member state has followed or diverged from the
general trend in the EU of rising unemployment and contracting employment.
The data in the first column of Table 12 reiterate the fact that, while the
overall rate of unemployment in the EU in the late 1990s was in the vicinity of 10
per cent, certain member states--most notably, Luxembourg (2.8 per cent in 1998),
the Netherlands (4.0), Austria (4.7), Portugal (4.9), Denmark (5.1), the U.K. (6.3),
and Ireland (7.8)--enjoyed significantly lower rates. Intriguingly, with the obvious
exception of the U.K., all of these are small "open"--i.e., trade-dependent--
economies, which suggests that openness may be associated with certain structural
attributes and/or behavioral  predispositions on the part of economic and political
actors that are conducive to maintaining high levels of employment.21
The data in the second column of Table 12 suggest that, while the rate of
unemployment in the EU as a whole did not change at all between the early 1990s
and 1998, and moved upward in several countries, some of the member states--
again, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the U.K., as well as Spain
and Finland--experienced significant decreases in unemployment between the first
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third column of Table 12 that, while the EU-wide level of unemployment rose by
more than three percentage points between 1974-85 and the late 1990s, the level of
unemployment in 1998 was significantly lower in some of the member states than
it had been in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, in the Netherlands, the rate of
unemployment was 3.1 percentage points lower in 1998. In Ireland, it was 2.8
percentage points lower. And in Portugal, Denmark, and the U.K. it was lower, by
2.0, 1.3, and 0.6 percentage points, respectively. Contrary to the long upward drift
in unemployment throughout most of the EU, and the EU as a whole, those
member states appear to have managed to reduce their long-term, structural, or
"natural" rates of unemployment.
The identity of group of states that by the late 1990s had managed to reduce
the rate of unemployment below the levels recorded in the late 1970s and early
1980s suggests that political factors may have played a role in that achievement.
Whether the relationship is causal or coincidental remains to be determined, but
there does nevertheless appear to be a systematic association between the political
experience of member states--specifically in regard to the partisan composition of
their governments--and their ability to effect significant reductions in the rate of
unemployment over the long term. In particular, it appears that most if not all of
the states effecting significant reductions over the long term shared a common
political attribute-- control of government for prolonged periods by conservative
and center-right parties and/or coalitions that were then followed by governments
formed by progressive, Social Democratic, and center-left parties. This is not to
say, of course, that the Thatcher governments in Britain, or those headed by
Lubbers in the Netherlands, or Schlüter in Denmark, or Cavaco Silva in Portugal,
sought to reduce the rate of unemployment. Indeed, in all of those cases, the rate
of unemployment rose dramatically. But what the perplexing, and disconcerting,
relationship does suggest is that it was perhaps the reality of high unemployment,
and threat of still higher levels of unemployment, at a time when government was
controlled by parties not sympathetic to labor, as well as changes in labor market
regulations and institutions effected by those governments, that caused economic
actors to give greater priority to the retention of existing jobs and creation of new
jobs. And it suggests that it was only some time later, after the conservative parties
had been removed from office and replaced by parties and coalitions of the center-
left, that the changes in institutions and behavior that began in the era of high
unemployment and conservative government could result in reductions in the rate
of unemployment that were of sufficient magnitude as to cause it to drop below
those experienced in the recent past.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 18
Table 12 also reiterates the fact that, unlike most of the member states,
certain countries--most notably, Austria, Luxembourg, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Germany--have been able to keep the level of unemployment among
young persons in single digits. And we note, also, that a few countries--most
notably, Denmark, Austria, and Finland--were able to keep the proportion of the
unemployed who were unemployed for more than one year at unusually low levels,
relative to the levels found elsewhere throughout most of the EU.
The data in Table 12 pertaining to employment tell much the same story.
Certain member states--most notably, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands,
but several others as well--experienced markedly higher cumulative increases in the
total number of persons employed between 1991 and 1997. In Ireland, for
example, the total number employed increased by 21 per cent between 1991 and
1997 and contributed to an increase of some six percentage points in the
employment rate. And in the Netherlands, the total number employed increased by
more than nine per cent between 1991 and 1997 and contributed to an increase of
some  nine percentage points in the employment rate between 1985 and 1997.
Britain, Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal experienced significant increases in
the rate of employment between 1985 and 1997 (as did Belgium, Spain, and
Ireland) and, partly as a result, enjoyed rates of employment that were significantly
higher than those existing in most of the EU in the late 1990s.
Taken together, the various measures reported in Table 12 suggest that some
of the member states of the EU--in particular, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Portugal, and Britain, but to some extent Austria and Luxembourg as well--were
able to counter the long-term trends contributing to higher levels of unemployment,
fewer persons employed, and smaller shares of the working-age population
employed in the EU. Why did the citizens of those states enjoy lower rates of
unemployment and higher rates of job creation and employment than the citizens
of other EU member states?
The prominent place of Ireland in the summary statistics presented in Table
12 immediately calls to mind one possible--indeed, obvious--reason why some
member states have been more successful than others in protecting and expanding
the ranks of the employed. Over the past decade, Ireland experienced truly
exceptional rates of economic growth--roughly seven per cent a year throughout
the 1990s, and in excess of 10 per cent a year, on average, in 1995-99.22
  What is true for Ireland regarding the close association between growth and
employment is true more generally in the EU. Figure 7 illustrates the near-perfect
association between the annual change in employment and the rate of economicRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 19
growth in the EU, lagged two quarters, over the period 1975-97.23 Likewise, when
one compares rates of growth and levels of employment and unemployment across
the member states, one finds a strong statistical relationship. For example, there is a
correlation across the fifteen member states of r = .80 between the rate of
economic growth in 1995-99 and the average annual per cent change in the number
employed in 1995-99, indicating that the member states with the highest rates of
growth experienced the highest average increases in employment. Similarly, we
observe a correlation of r = -.68 between the rate of growth in 1995-99 and the
increase in unemployment between 1991-96 and 1998-99, indicating that the
member states with the highest rates of growth experienced the greatest decreases
in unemployment in the 1990s. And finally, we find a strong inverse association, r
= -.81, between the magnitude of the average annual increase in employment in
1995-99 and the increase in the rate of unemployment between 1991-96 and 1998-
99, indicating that large increases in the number employed are associated with large
decreases in unemployment.
That growth is closely associated with employment and unemployment is, of
course, a macroeconomic truism.  If one wishes to explain why one country
experiences a deterioration in employment, and an increase in the rate of
unemployment, while another experiences an expansion in employment, and a
decrease in the rate of unemployment, surely one would start by comparing the
rates of economic growth in the two countries.  Likewise, from a prescriptive
perspective, the close association between growth and employment described in
Figure 7 and our cross-national  correlations suggests that the surest means of
attaining a lower level of unemployment in a country, or in a grouping of countries
such as the EU, is to attain and sustain a high rate of economic growth.
The Irish case is, of course, something of an anomaly in the European
context. Its truly exceptional levels of growth reflected, no doubt, the lagged effect
of equally exceptional levels of investment that ranged between 24 and 30 per cent
of GDP from the early 1970s to early 1980s--levels that reflected, in large part, a
quite exceptional degree of foreign direct investment as Ireland became a
production and export base for firms moving into the European market.24  With
such high rates of investment and growth sustained over a long period, it is hardly
surprising that the level of unemployment was dragged down from the range of 16
per cent in 1985-88 and 15 per cent in 1992-93 to the range of 8 per cent or less in
1998 and 1999 and that the number of persons employed, and the employment
rate, increased dramatically in the 1990s. Nevertheless, however anomalous it may
be, the Irish experience does testify to the very strong impact that sustained high
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The Irish case is not the only one in which high rates of unemployment
dropped sharply in the wake of sustained high rates of growth. Spain in the mid-to-
late 1990s experienced an equally dramatic reduction in the rate of unemployment,
from more than 24 per cent in 1994 to less than 16 per cent by mid-1999. Spain,
of course, experienced exceptionally high levels of unemployment throughout the
1980s and 1990s--between 1982 and 1999, for example, the rate of unemployment
in Spain never dropped below 16 per cent--and was, indeed, so exceptional in that
regard that it gave rise to a voluminous literature seeking to account for its
unusually high rate of unemployment.25  While many factors contributed to the
sustained reduction in unemployment in Spain in the last half of the 1990s, one of
the most important, no doubt, and one that would have to figure prominently in
any reassessment of its performance in regard to employment in last half of the
1990s, was a rate of economic growth that, although below that registered in
Ireland, was nevertheless sustained at an unusually high (and accelerating) level.26
As important as Spain's sustained high rate of growth was in driving down
the rate of unemployment in the late 1990s, that reduction was also the result of
significant changes in the existing institutions and rules pertaining to the labor
market. In 1997, under the aegis of the new conservative government headed by
José  María  Aznar, the employers confederation (CEOE) and the two labor
confederations (the CC.OO. and the UGT) agreed to modify some of the rules
governing the Spanish labor market.27 The unions agreed to a significant reduction
in the amount of compensation that companies had to pay to permanent workers
who were laid off, the employers accepted longer-term (up to four years and
renewable) fixed-term work contracts, and both sides agreed to continue
negotiating on expanding the use of part-time employment. In return for their
acceptance of these changes, the government committed itself to a large-scale jobs
program that involved increased spending on a variety of "active" measures such as
training, employment, and vocational programs (as opposed to such traditional
"passive" measures as income supports for the unemployed). Thus, it committed
itself to involving some 725,000 unemployed young persons and adults in training,
employment, and vocational guidance programs before they had reached six and
twelve months of unemployment, respectively, in 1998, and it made plans to offer
up to one million of the 2.7 million unemployed work under new "employability
action" programs. As a result, in the first three years after the 1997 accord, more
than one million jobs (260,000 in 1997, 440,000 in 1998, and at least 370,000 in
1999) were created in Spain--more new jobs than were created in all of the other
member states of the euro-zone put together!28RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 21
The magnitude of the decrease in the rate of unemployment in Spain in the
late 1990s was unusual and was, perhaps, rivaled only by the magnitude of the
decrease experienced in Ireland. But the institutional means by which that reduction
was initiated--national bargaining between employers and labor over issues
pertaining to the regulation and flexibility of labor market--was by no means
unusual or exceptional. Indeed, as several scholars have noted, the existence of
high and rising levels of unemployment in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s caused
new patterns of bargaining to appear that, while reminiscent in certain respects of
earlier forms of "corporatist" bargaining--for example, in the negotiation of national
"frame" agreements-- were more decentralized, gave greater latitude to those
bargaining at the level of sectors and firms, and resulted in more widely varying
settlements.29 While the decentralized, flexible, and somewhat ad hoc character of
these new bargaining arrangements differentiated them from the older forms of
institutionalized national-level bargaining, they did nevertheless retain some features
of the older forms of bargaining--for example, in involving government in
agreements with the economic partners that enabled them to reach agreements with
each other. And in one important respect, the governments remained deeply
involved, because, to a greater extent than was the case when the older forms of
"corporatism" prevailed in times of near-full employment such as prevailed in the
pre-OPEC era, the essential quid-pro-quo's for concessions in wages often involved
government policy in support of the creation of jobs--e.g., reductions in the work
week or retirement age, regulations pertaining to part-time employment, the
creation of public sector jobs as well as training and re-training programs, etc.30
That labor market and bargaining institutions have affected the performance
of some economies in regard to employment is supported not only by the recent
experience of Spain described earlier but by the experiences of several of the states
that now enjoy unusually low levels of unemployment. Indeed, all of the smaller
states that stood out among the EU member states at the end of the 1990s for their
relatively low levels of unemployment--Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Luxembourg, Austria, and Portugal--witnessed the appearance of new patterns of
collective bargaining--patterns that in some instances drew upon pre-existing
"corporatist" traditions but in all cases involved more decentralized and flexible, and
less institutionalized, forms--that were centrally concerned with employment and
the creation of jobs.
Thus, for example, the relative success of Ireland and the Netherlands in
creating large numbers of new jobs at a time when much of Europe was suffering
from very high levels of unemployment and an inability to create large numbers of
new jobs, reflected in part the impact of new forms and patterns of collective
bargaining over wages and work. In addition to being, like Denmark, Portugal, and,RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 22
of course, Luxembourg, small open economies in which the high degree of trade
dependence sensitizes economic actors to the trade-offs between wages and work,
both Ireland and the Netherlands have well educated, skilled work forces, as well
as job training and re-training programs (the latter in part a legacy of the very high
levels of unemployment in both countries in the mid-1980s), all of which may have
contributed to their successes with regard to unemployment in the 1990s. But
equally important, both have created institutional mechanisms through which wage
restraint has been negotiated and maintained, in exchange for a commitment from
government to enact a variety of job-creating measures. In both, the major
economic actors--labor confederations and employers associations--have, with the
informal support of the government, reached agreements that are, in certain
respects, reminiscent of the earlier corporatist bargains and have resulted in wage
moderation in return for job creation.
Perhaps the most famous instance of the renewed, albeit more decentralized
and bipartite, quasi-corporatist bargaining over wages and employment between
employers and labor has occurred in the Netherlands.  Acting in the face of
unemployment rates that were already in double digits and were continuing to rise,
the Dutch labor confederation (the FNV) agreed at Wassenaar in 1982 and in later
negotiations to moderate its demands for wage increases, de-link public and private
sector wages, de-index certain social benefits, and introduce stricter criteria for
eligibility for disability and other social benefits in return for a commitment from
the employers association (the VNO-NCW) to preserve existing jobs and create
new ones, accept a shorter work week, institute more flexible work arrangements
that would allow substantial part-time and temporary employment, and introduce
new employment schemes that would subsidize employment of the unskilled and
long-term unemployed (often referred to as "Melkert" jobs after the Social Affairs
minister who introduced the schemes).31 In the absence of investment ratios and
FDI of the magnitude enjoyed by the Irish, once must conclude that it was, above
all, the sustained wage restraint in the Netherlands from 1982 onward--reflected in
unusually small increases in real compensation and unit labor costs--that fueled the
exceptional growth in employment in the 1980s and 1990s that brought the
country's level of unemployment down to the vicinity of 5 per cent.
Discussion: Unemployment in the Era of EMU
On January 1, 1999, eleven member states of the EU jointly entered the third and
final stage of Economic and Monetary Union. As they did so, they presided over
economies that, for the most part, suffered from low rates of economic growth and
high rates of unemployment. Indeed, in 1999 the rate of unemployment in the
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significantly in the foreseeable future. By its constituting documents, the European
Central Bank, which is charged with sole responsibility for monetary policy in the
euro-zone, is independent of political instruction and singularly committed to the
objective of maintaining stable prices. In addition, in 1997 the governments of the
EU agreed to a "Stability and Growth Pact", under the terms of which their ability
to use fiscal policy to stimulate the economy was severely curtailed.32 That being
the case, to what extent, if at all, will the eleven participating member states be able
to change the pattern of repeated, synchronized recessions, relatively low rates of
economic growth, and high rates of unemployment that has afflicted most of them
in recent years? Will EMU effect changes in the structures of the  euro-zone
economies or, in policy, that will be conducive to higher rates of economic growth
over the long term? Will the irrevocable locking of exchange rates and eventual use
of a single currency reduce the costs of financial transactions and the risks
associated with capital investments to such an extent as to increase the aggregate
rates of capital formation, growth, and employment in the euro-zone?  Will the
creation of a single central bank independent of political instruction and dedicated
to the attainment and maintenance of price stability, coupled with the strictures on
budget deficits, create such a "culture of stability" that, as inflation is tamed once
and for all, interest rates will drop to and remain at low levels, thereby fueling
higher levels of production and consumption, investment and growth, and
employment? Or, on the other hand, will the existence of an independent central
bank that is constitutionally insulated from politics and committed above all to price
stability result in a monetary policy that tolerates high interest rates in the name of
fighting inflation, even at the cost of lower rates of economic growth and higher
levels of unemployment? Obviously, it is much too early in the experience of EMU
to answer such questions with any degree of confidence. Nevertheless, it is not too
early to ask such questions and we conclude this chapter with some conjectures
about the likely effects of EMU on unemployment in Europe.33
The Structural Effects of EMU
There can be no doubt that EMU has already had, and will continue to have, far-
reaching structural consequences for the economies of the participating member
states. Especially for firms involved in financial services, but also for firms in a
variety of other sectors as well, the irrevocable locking of the exchange rates of the
participating currencies and eventual introduction of the euro will bring greater
transparency in producer costs and enable consumers to compare prices more
meaningfully and to be more fully informed in making choices among competing
producers. That, in turn, is likely to lead to some downward pressure on prices,
and price harmonization at the low end, that will presumably be of greatest benefit
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zone Conversely, smaller, high-cost producers which have heretofore benefited by
operating behind various forms of national protection, including the ability to price
goods in national currencies, may be hurt by that downward pressure on prices.
As important as those changes in the competitive position of firms will be,
both for the firms themselves and consumers, the aggregate effect of those changes
on levels of unemployment is uncertain. The competitive advantages enjoyed by
the low-cost producers should result in increases in employment. But any such
gains may be off-set, in part or in full, by losses of jobs in the high-cost firms that
are at a competitive disadvantage in the more transparent euro-economy. No doubt
competitive pressures on firms will be intensified by the greater transparency of
costs and comparability of prices across the euro-zone. But it is not immediately
apparent that that will have any significant effect on the overall rates of
unemployment in the euro-zone and its participating member states.
Beyond the employment-generating and employment-contracting firm-level
effects of greater transparency, the advent of EMU and adoption of a single
currency in most of the member states of the EU will undoubtedly transform
certain sectors of the European economy.  The financial services sector, in
particular, is likely to be transformed--and has, indeed, already experienced
dramatic change in such countries as France, Italy, and Spain--as some banks and
other financial institutions are better able than others to create economies of scale
through mergers and acquisitions and other adaptations to the larger euro-market.
The consolidation that has already begun and will surely continue in financial
services will undoubtedly cause a good deal of unemployment within the sector in
the short term. On the other hand, over the longer term that change may contribute
to the process of job creation and a reduction in the current high levels of
unemployment. For example, as the sector experiences consolidation, and
increasing concentration in a smaller number of larger institutions offering the full
range of financial services throughout the EU, financial markets in Europe will
inevitably become deeper, more liquid, and more highly integrated.34 That
increased liquidity and depth should make it less difficult for small and new firms to
obtain capital--which is potentially of great consequence for employment since
most new jobs in Europe (and elsewhere) are created in small and new firms. On
balance, then, the structural changes generated by EMU may quite possibly
contribute to a reduction in the level of unemployment in the euro-zone over the
long term through their contribution to economic growth and, in particular, by
providing the institutional prerequisites for the development of new and small firms.
But at least in the short term, while the process of consolidation and integration is
taking place, that process could actually cause local increases in unemployment.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 25
Interest Rates and Investment
While the advent of the third and final stage of EMU has already begun to trigger a
series of changes at the firm and sectoral level in the European economy, it is by
no means obvious that EMU will contribute (except indirectly and through those
firm and sectoral changes) to the attainment of a higher rate of economic growth
and a lower level of unemployment. It would, of course, be unreasonable to expect
or insist that EMU have that effect; after all, EMU was not designed and
implemented in order to achieve a higher rate of growth and lower level of
unemployment but, rather, for other, quite different purposes.35 That, of course,
has not stopped many from assuming that, in addition to its other effects, EMU
would result in an increase in the rate of growth and a decrease in the level of
unemployment in Europe, and, indeed, the Commission itself claimed as much in
the comprehensive analysis of the economic effects of EMU it published in 1992,
soon after the completion of the Treaty on European Union.36
The authors of the Commission's 1992 analysis, and many others, have
assumed that eliminating exchange rate uncertainty through the creation of a single
currency will reduce transaction costs within the single market and increase the
risk-adjusted rate of return on investment, thereby stimulating higher levels of
investment, which in turn will generate higher rates of economic growth and, as a
result, lower rates of unemployment. Moreover, the existence of low rates of
inflation in the member states participating in EMU, the improvement in their
public finances, and the credibility of their commitment to maintain those policies
for the foreseeable future will, it is assumed, allow interest rates to remain at lower
levels than at present, thereby further stimulating investment, growth, and
employment.
There can be no doubt that the stimulation of higher levels of investment
represents a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for raising the long-term rate of
employment in Europe through its effect on growth. That is, relatively high levels
of investment over the long term tend, all else equal, to generate relatively high
rates of economic growth, and those high rates of growth, in turn, tend to drag
down the level of unemployment.37 From that perspective, the long upward drift in
the rate of unemployment over the past three decades in Europe can be viewed as
the result of a long downward drift over that period in both the proportion of GDP
that was invested and the long-term rate of economic growth.38 Perhaps, then, if
the downward drift in investment over the past several decades is reversed, the rate
of economic growth will increase and, in the wake of that increase, the rate of
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As plausible as it may be to assume that EMU will contribute to higher levels
of investment, and in turn higher rates of growth and employment, it is by no
means certain that it will in fact have that effect. Among other things, it is not
obvious that the existence of transaction costs among the multiple currencies of the
EU prior to January 1, 1999 actually deterred any investment in the eleven
countries of the euro-zone--in which case the suggestion that their absence since
the advent of EMU will facilitate investment may be no more than wishful thinking.
For another, while it is plausible to think that the low rates of inflation, small public
deficits, and commitment of the EMU participants to those policies will enable
them to enjoy lower interest rates than existed prior to the run-up to the third stage,
it is important to note, first of all, that for most of the EMU participants interest
rates had already reached very low levels--in the range of 3-3.5 per cent--in the
mid-1990s prior to the advent of EMU, meaning that there was only a limited range
for any further rate reductions. It is true, of course, that several of the EMU
participants with traditionally high interest rates--most notably, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, and Ireland--experienced significant reductions in the run-up to EMU.
But since those reductions occurred in a series of steps in 1996-98, it is likely that
most, if not all, of their stimulative effect occurred prior to or in the first few
months after the advent of EMU.39
Monetary Policy under the European Central Bank
By Articles 105 and 107 and Protocol 3 of the Treaty on European Union, the
European Central Bank is singularly committed to the attainment and maintenance
of price stability and free of all political instruction.40 Even if that Treaty-derived
commitment to price stability did not exist, it would be reasonable to expect that,
especially in its early years, when the credibility of its commitment to maintain the
value of the new currency would depend, to a large extent, upon its behavior, the
ECB would maintain rates sufficiently high to prevent inflationary increases in the
money supply and depreciation of the value of the  euro--even at the cost of
dampening the rate of economic growth and perpetuating high levels of
unemployment. That would be all the more likely since the credibility of the euro
as a strong currency and the ECB as the guarantor of its value will have to be
established not only in international financial markets but also in the national
political markets of the participating member states, some of whose publics view
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If one assumed that the Bank would follow the strictures of the Treaty, then,
one would expect it to pay close attention to changes in various measures of growth
in money, credit, and prices, and to pursue whatever course it deemed appropriate
in order to maintain stable prices and the value of the euro. Yet in its first year of
existence, an intriguing discrepancy appeared between this conventional view of
how the Bank should and would act, and its actual behavior--a discrepancy that
suggested that it would act--albeit grudgingly, perhaps--with at least some
sensitivity to the issue of low growth and high unemployment.
In October, 1998, for example, the ECB's Governing Council decided that its
monetary policy strategy would consist of achieving price stability--defined as an
annual rate of change in the harmonized index of consumer prices of less than two
per cent--by comparing  changeds in a specific monetary aggregate (M3) with a
quantitative target range that is judged to be consistent with price stability.42 What
is notable about this strategy, of course, was the latitude it provided the Bank. By
defining price stability in terms of a range of inflation from 0 to 2 per cent, the
Bank could allow the current rate of inflation in the euro-zone at the time (about 1
per cent) to double without being obliged to tighten policy. (On the other hand, it
should be noted that, by defining price stability in terms of a range that begins at 0,
the ECB implicitly committed itself to maintaining a vigilant posture vis-à-vis prices
even when the rate of change in prices is negligible). And by targeting both the rate
of inflation and a broad monetary aggregate (M3), the ECB gave itself some
additional flexibility; for example, it could hold back on raising interest rates in the
face of rising prices if the money supply was for some reason contracting, and,
conversely, it could hold back on raising rates even if the money supply was
increasing at a rate that exceeded its target as long as prices were not increasing (a
situation that existed during much of 1999).
Subsequent to its adoption of a monetary policy strategy that gives it some
degree of latitude and flexibility, the ECB pursued a policy that can not be
understood simply in terms of its implemenation of its Treaty-mandated objectives.
In December, 1998, it orchestrated a coordinated reduction in the interest rates of
the eleven member states that were about to enter EMU, and in April, 1999, it
lowered its benchmark rate from 3.0 to 2.5 per cent, a reduction the size of which
took commentators by surprise. The combined effect of the sharp reductions in
interest rates that had occurred in Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal in the run-up
to EMU, the small reductions in rates that took place in the other participating
member states prior to January 1, 1999, and the reduction in the benchmark rate in
April resulted in a euro-zone interest rate during the first year of EMU that was
well below a weighted average of the rates that prevailed in the eleven member
states prior to the advent of EMU. And more to the point, the Bank's benchmarkRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 28
rate remained unchanged for more than half a year after April, 1999, and at or near
their historic lows (in nominal terms), despite increases in the M3 measure of
money supply that exceeded the Bank's targeted growth rate, large increases in
private sector credit, and a drop of more than ten per cent in the value of the euro
relative to the dollar.
How should this apparent discrepancy between the Treaty-defined objectives
of the ECB and its actual conduct be understood, and what implications, if any,
can be drawn in regard to the effect of the Bank's monetary policy on
unemployment? Perhaps the best way to understand the apparent discrepancy is to
regard it as the inevitable disjunction between the Treaty, on one hand, and the
reality of a new institution which exists and operates in a complex political and
economic context, on the other.  For although the ECB is, by the Treaty on
European Union, highly immunized and formally independent of political direction,
it nevertheless exists as one supranational institution among several, in an
institutional and political context in which other interested actors are able to make
their preferences in regard to monetary policy known--and in voices loud enough
that even the well-insulated ECB sitting in its tower in  Franfurt can hear. As
Lohmann (1998: 445) argued in regard to German monetary policy, "the specifics
of how a central bank is embedded in a larger political system matter a great deal".
Among the most important of the interested actors whose voices will be
heard, even by the well-insulated ECB, of course, are the governments of the
participating member states, meeting in the Euro-11, the newly-created forum
consisting of the finance ministers of the member states participating in the euro-
zone, as well as in the Councils of the EU (e.g., the Ecofin council of ministers and
the European Council of heads of state and government).43 As Oskar Lafontaine's
outspoken advocacy, in the Fall of 1998 after the German election, of a reduction
in interest rates demonstrated, political leaders in the participating member states
will undoubtedly articulate their views and preferences in regard to monetary
policy, interest rates, growth, unemployment, and other matters, irrespective of
what the Treaty says about the ECB's independence from political direction, not
only within the confines of EU institutions but in public as well.44 Likewise, the
European Parliament, with its powers and standing enhanced in the wake of the
ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the resignation of the  Santer
Commission in March 1999, and exercising an oversight role based on the periodic
reporting to its Monetary Affairs Sub-Committee by the ECB President, will
undoubtedly continue to constitute an important venue for examining, and
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As a result, however hawkish the ECB may sound, most of the time, about
inflation, however much it drags its feet in moving rates down, and however great
its propensity to raise rates, it may in fact exercise its discretion in ways that do not
always correspond to the conventional view that it is, and will always be,
concerned only with maintaining stable prices. Occasionally, perhaps--especially
when the member states make their views known within the institutions of the EU-
-it may even act in such a way as to give the economy a little stimulative boost.
That may not be of much consolation to those who are unemployed and those who
would prefer a monetary policy that would promote growth and employment. But
it is a bit more than they could reasonably expect from a Bank that adhered rigidly
to its Treaty mandate. And it is likely to be all they will get.
EU-Level Employment Policy
EMU and unemployment are inextricably linked. Whether or not they are causally
linked is a matter of debate and speculation, but they certainly are politically
intertwined, as was made obvious at the Amsterdam meeting of the European
Council in June 1997 when, in order to obtain the support of the new Socialist-
dominated French government for the "Stability and Growth Pact", it issued a
resolution on growth and employment that declared that it was "imperative to give
a new impulse for keeping employment firmly at the top of the political agenda of
the European Union [and] to strengthen the links between a successful and
sustainable economic and monetary union, a well-functioning internal market and
employment"45, reaffirmed the importance of employment and the need to reduce
the high levels of unemployment, especially among the young, the long-term
unemployed, and the low skilled, reiterated the need for a positive and coherent
approach to job creation, noted with approval the inclusion in the Treaty of a new
title on employment, and announced that it would meet in the Fall of 1997 to
review progress in implementing various job creation initiatives and various "good
practices" in employment.46
In November 1997, the European Council met in Luxembourg for its "jobs
summit" and agreed on a modest package of proposals to address the issue of
structural unemployment. The leaders adopted a joint action plan that included,
among other things, the submission to the Council of annual national action plans to
reduce unemployment that would be subject to review by the Council.  They
agreed, among other things, that all those under the age of 25 who are unemployed
should be offered new employment within six months and all others who are
unemployed should receive new jobs within a year, and all of the member states
except Spain agreed those targets should be met within five years. They also agreed
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unemployed receive job retraining, at least 20 per cent of the unemployed should
be offered such training. And they called upon the European Investment Bank to
raise an extra Ecu 10 billion to finance small and medium-sized businesses, new
technology ventures and labor-intensive projects in the service sector, including
health and education, and called upon the member states to simplify their
regulatory rules for small businesses and to reverse the long-term upward trend in
the taxes and non-wage costs associated with employment.47
However well-intended the Luxembourg "jobs summit" was, and however
sincere the leaders were in their commitment to reduce unemployment, it is of
course obvious that a one-day meeting of leaders, and the adoption of various
schemes for "national action plans", targets, and guidelines, can do very little, if
anything, to reduce the high levels of unemployment that exist throughout much of
the EU--especially, of course, if much of the high unemployment is, as the IMF
and ECB claim, structural rather than cyclical in nature.48 Nevertheless, the "jobs
summit" may at least have concentrated greater attention on the issue of how and
why job creation occurs and, in so doing, called attention to a host of "supply-
side", microeconomic issues, involving unemployment benefits, tax levels and
employer incentives, labor market regulations and rigidities, wage and non-wage
costs, and job training and retraining, that, if addressed coherently from the
perspective of increasing employment, could conceivably have a discernible effect
in reducing the high level of structural unemployment, above and beyond whatever
reduction occurs through the continued recovery from the synchronized recession
of the early 1990s.
During the first half of 1999, the German government made the reduction of
unemployment its chief priority during its presidency of the EU, and its desire to
bring the national and European experiences together in an "employment pact" kept
attention focused on the issue as EMU was launched.49 Prospects for such a "pact"
were, of course, dashed when  Lafontaine abruptly quit as Germany's finance
minister mid-way through its presidency. But Germany did at least gain support at
the Köln meeting of the European Council for its proposal that (taking a leaf from
its own "alliance for jobs") the EU undertake a tripartite macroeconomic dialogue
with employers and labor aimed at creating jobs. Whether such talks will take place
on a regular basis and prove to be effective in alleviating unemployment remains to
be seen.  But what is perhaps most interesting, and potentially of greatest
significance in the long run, about the decisions taken at Amsterdam, Luxembourg,
and Köln, is that, in the wake of EMU, the problem of unemployment policy has
not only become a high priority for the political leadership of Europe but has
become one in which the EU has begun to play an increasingly important role.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 31
Conclusion
Over the past three decades, Europe has become a region afflicted by high rates of
unemployment. With few exceptions, the member states of the EU not only suffer
rates of unemployment that are considerably higher than those experienced two or
three decades ago and are considerably higher than those experienced by the
United States and Japan. They also suffer, again with a few notable exceptions,
from an inability to create large numbers of new jobs, an inability to create jobs for
young workers, especially young women, and an inability to put back to work
those who have lost jobs. And they suffer from the existence of large
geographically-concentrated regions of high unemployment.
This paper has examined the enduring problem of high unemployment in
Europe. It considered how the rate of unemployment has varied across time and
space in the European Union, and how it has varied in regard to age, gender, and
region.  After describing those temporal and spatial variations in some detail, it
considered why it was that, notwithstanding the general upward trend in
unemployment throughout Europe in recent decades, some of the member states of
the EU were far more successful than others in creating large numbers of new jobs
and resisting the upward trend--and, in a few instances, even reversing the upward
trend. Among the factors that appear to have allowed some of the member states to
create enough new jobs to reduce the rate of unemployment over the long term--
that is, to reduce the structural level of unemployment--are, in addition to the
obvious importance of sustained high rates of economic growth, political-
institutional features involving the government and the institutions that influence the
collective behavior of economic actors.  In particular, government by Socialist,
Social Democratic, or Labor parties following a substantial period of government
by conservative parties, and the existence of institutional venues for bargaining
between employers and unions over wages and work appear to have resulted in
policies and agreements that have contributed to significant reductions in
unemployment in some member states.
On January 1, 1999, eleven member states of the European Union entered
the third and final stage of Economic and Monetary Union. The advent of EMU
undoubtedly represented one of the most dramatic and far-reaching institutional
changes to have occurred over the past four decades in Europe, and it is logical--
even necessary--to consider the likely effects of EMU on the enduring problem of
high unemployment.  The concluding section of the chapter considered several
aspects of EMU that might conceivably affect the rate of unemployment in the
euro-zone as a whole and in the individual participating member states--for
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European economies, its possible effect on interest rates and investment levels and,
through them, on rates of growth and employment, and, finally, the likely effect of
the  ECB's monetary policy. The discussion suggested, for example, that the
structural changes generated by EMU may have both employment-creating and
employment-destroying effects, probably the latter before the former. It suggested
that EMU may not, contrary to its institutional proponents, result in any significant
increase in levels of investment over the long term, apart from that derive indirectly
from the structural changes. And it suggested, on the other hand, that the ECB may
act on occasion in ways that are more  nuanced, and occasionally even more
sensitive to issues of growth and employment, than one would predict on the basis
of its constituting documents--in large part because, although politically insulated
and formally independent of political instruction, the ECB is embedded in a
complex and densely articulated web of national and supranational institutions that
are, themselves, embedded in the societies, economies, and polities of Europe.
  It is, of course, much too soon to say whether the advent of EMU in eleven
of the member states of the EU will eventually provide a remedy for the enduring
high levels of unemployment that continue to afflict most of Europe. Perhaps the
most that can be said, at this early point in the history of EMU, is that how
Europeans come to think about and evaluate EMU in the future will in all likelihood
depend on how it is perceived to have affected the performance of the European
economies. And that, in turn, is likely to depend in large part on whether the
governments of the  euro-zone participants, acting not only individually but
collectively through the institutions of the EU, are able, within the constraints
introduced by EMU, to create the social, political, and economic conditions and
policies necessary for sustained growth, job creation, and employment. It is still
very early in the life of EMU. But there are intriguing suggestions--in the active role
in macroeconomic policy coordination taken by the Euro-11 grouping and the
decisions taken in regard to employment issues at the Amsterdam, Luxembourg,
and Köln meetings of the European Council--that one significant effect of EMU
has been to raise the salience of unemployment and make it increasingly a matter
for collective action by the member states acting through the institutions of the EU.
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Table 1. Unemployment and Growth in the European Union, the U.S., and Japan
Average Annual Per Cent of Civilian Labor Force, Unemployed
1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-99
European Union 2.2 4.0 9.0 10.1
United States 4.7 6.4 7.1 5.8
Japan 1.2 1.8 2.5 3.1
Average Annual Per Cent Change, GDP in Constant Prices
1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-99
European Union 4.8 3.0 2.4 1.9
United States 4.2 3.2 2.9 2.5
Japan 10.5 4.5 4.0 1.1
Source: European Commission 1998b, 69, 83. The measures of unemployment follow  Eurostat
definitions.
Table 2. Job Creation in the European Union, the U.S., and Japan, 1961-99
Average Annual Change in Total Employed
1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-99
European Union 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.0
United States 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.5
Japan 1.4 0.7 0.9 0.4
Source: European Commission 1998b, 67.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 34











Belgium 2.0 7.7 8.7 8.8 9.4 9.5 9.0
Denmark 0.9 6.4 6.4 8.3 5.6 5.1 4.5
Germany 0.7 4.2 5.9 7.6 9.9 9.4 9.1
Greece 4.5 3.8 6.6 8.5 10.0 11.6
Spain 2.8 11.3 18.9 21.1 20.8 18.8 15.9
France 2.2 6.4 9.7 11.3 12.3 11.7 11.0
Ireland 5.6 10.6 15.5 14.0 9.8 7.8
Italy 5.2 7.0 9.6 10.6 12.1 12.2
Luxembourg 0.0 1.7 2.1 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8
Netherlands 1.3 7.1 7.4 6.4 5.2 4.0 3.2
Austria 1.6 2.5 3.4 3.8 4.4 4.7 4.3
Portugal 2.5 6.9 6.1 5.9 6.8 4.9 4.5
Finland 2.3 4.8 4.3 14.2 12.7 11.4 9.8
Sweden 2.0 2.4 2.0 7.6 9.9 8.3 6.8
U.K. 2.0 6.9 9.0 9.3 7.0 6.3
EU 2.3 6.4 8.9 10.0 10.6 10.0
Euro-11 2.5 6.6 9.4 10.7 11.6 10.9 10.2
Source: European Commission 1998b: 224-53; Statistical Office of European Communities 1999: 57-9.
The data reported here are seasonally adjusted and use  Eurostat's standardized definition of
unemployment. The data are identical to the standardized measures of unemployment reported by the
OECD. July 1999 figures: Eurostat press release, Sept. 8, 1999.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 35
Table 4. Average Annual Per Cent Change in Total Employment in the EU, 1961-99
1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-99
Belgium 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1
Denmark 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.5
Germany 0.2 0.2 0.5 -0.5
Greece -0.8 0.7 1.0 0.5
Spain 0.6 -0.6 0.8 0.9
France 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.2
Ireland 0.0 0.9 -0.2 2.7
Italy -0.5 1.0 0.6 -0.5
Luxembourg 0.6 1.2 1.7 2.8
Netherlands 1.2 0.2 0.6 1.4
Austria -0.5 0.7 0.1 0.4
Portugal 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4
Finland 0.4 0.2 0.4 -1.2
Sweden 0.7 0.8 0.7 -1.1
U.K. 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2
EU 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.0
Euro-11
Source: European Commission 1998b: 66-67.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 36


















Source: European Commission 1998a: 149-64. The data for Germany in 1985-91 is for the pre-1990
Federal Republic only.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 37
Table 6. Per Cent of Working Age Population (15-64) Employed in the EU, 1985-97
1985 1991 1997 Change 1985-97
Belgium 53.1 56.1 57.3 4.2
Denmark 77.4 76.6 77.5 0.1
Germany 63.1 67.5 61.8 -1.3
Greece 57.3 54.7 56.7 -0.6
Spain 44.1 49.7 48.6 4.5
France 62.0 62.0 60.1 -1.9
Ireland 51.4 52.7 57.8 6.4
Italy 53.0 53.7 51.3 -1.7
Luxembourg 59.0 61.1 60.6 1.6
Netherlands 57.7 63.0 66.7 9.0
Austria 67.3 69.8 69.9 2.6
Portugal 63.5 67.7 67.5 4.0
Finland 75.2 71.4 63.9 -11.3
Sweden 80.3 80.9 69.5 -10.8
U.K. 66.2 70.8 70.8 4.6
EU 59.8 62.6 60.5 0.7
Source: European Commission 1998a: 149-64.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 38
Table 7. Unemployment by Age and Gender in the EU, the United States, and Japan
1998
(% of Active Labor Force)
EU U.S. Japan
All 10.0 4.5 4.1
All Men 8.6 4.4 4.2
All Women 11.8 4.6 4.0
All        < 25 19.5 10.4 6.9
Men      < 25 18.2 11.1 6.7
Women < 25 21.0 9.8 7.1
              
Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities 1999: 57-59.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 39
Table 8. Unemployment in the EU by Age and Gender, 1998
(% of Active Labor Force)
All All Men All Women All < 25 Men < 25 Women <
25
Belgium 9.5 7.7 11.9 22.1 19.7 25.1
Denmark 5.1 3.9 6.5 7.4 6.8 8.0
Germany 9.4 8.9 10.2 9.8 10.6 9.0
Greece 11.6 7.8 17.4 32.1 23.0 42.3
Spain 18.8 13.8 26.6 35.4 29.0 43.3
France 11.7 9.9 13.8 26.6 24.2 29.2
Ireland 7.8 8.0 7.6 11.5 11.8 11.1
Italy 12.2 9.4 16.7 31.6 28.3 36.0
Luxembourg 2.8 2.0 4.2 6.9 7.0 6.8
Netherlands 4.0 3.0 5.2 7.8 7.6 8.1
Austria 4.7 3.9 5.6 6.6 5.3 8.1
Portugal 4.9 3.9 6.1 9.8 8.2 11.8
Finland 11.4 10.8 12.0 23.5 22.5 24.6
Sweden 8.3 8.6 8.0 16.7 17.3 16.1
U.K. 6.3 7.0 5.5 13.6 15.2 11.7
EU 10.0 8.6 11.8 19.5 18.2 21.0
Euro-11 10.9 9.1 13.4 21.1 19.2 23.4
Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities 1999: 57-59.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 40
Table 9. Per Cent of the Population Aged 15-64 in Active Labor Force, 1997
All Men Women
Belgium 63.1 72.7 53.3
Denmark 82.4 87.9 76.8
Germany 68.7 77.1 60.2
Greece 62.8 79.8 47.1
Spain 61.3 75.6 47.3
France 68.5 75.7 61.5
Ireland 64.3 78.0 50.4
Italy 58.4 73.1 43.9
Luxembourg 62.8 77.7 48.9
Netherlands 70.4 81.3 59.2
Austria 73.0 83.3 62.8
Portugal 72.5 82.1 63.6
Finland 74.0 76.8 71.2
Sweden 77.4 79.6 75.0
U.K. 76.2 84.4 68.0
EU 67.8 77.8 57.7
Source: European Commission 1998a: 149-64.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 41
Table 10. Per Cent of All Unemployed, Unemployed For More Than One Year, 1997
All Men Women
Belgium 60.5 59.5 61.6
Denmark 27.2 25.0 27.7
Germany 50.1 47.1 53.6
Greece 55.7 45.3 62.0
Spain 51.8 45.7 57.3
France 39.6 38.0 41.0
Ireland 56.6 63.4 46.6
Italy 66.3 66.5 66.2
Luxembourg na na na
Netherlands 49.2 49.7 48.3
Austria 28.5 28.6 27.6
Portugal 55.4 53.4 57.3
Finland 29.6 31.9 27.1
Sweden 34.2 35.5 32.2
U.K. 38.6 44.8 27.8
EU 49.0 47.4 50.6
Source: European Commission 1998a: 149-64.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 42
Table 11. Part-Time Employment and Work on Fixed-Term Contracts in the EU, 1997
% of Total Employed,
Employed Part-Time
% of Total Employed,
On Fixed-Term Contracts
All Men Women
Belgium 14.7 3.3 31.4 6.3
Denmark 22.2 12.1 34.5 11.1
Germany 17.5 4.2 35.1 11.7
Greece 4.6 2.6 8.1 10.9
Spain 8.2 3.2 17.4 33.6
France 16.8 5.4 30.9 13.1
Ireland 12.3 5.4 23.2 9.4
Italy 7.1 3.3 13.7 8.2
Luxembourg 7.7 1.0 19.4 2.1
Netherlands 38.0 17.0 67.9 11.4
Austria 14.9 4.0 29.0 7.8
Portugal 9.9 5.7 15.0 12.2
Finland 11.4 7.6 15.6 17.1
Sweden 24.5 9.3 41.4 12.1
U.K. 24.9 8.8 44.9 7.4
EU 16.9 5.8 32.4 12.2
Source: European Commission 1998a: 149-64.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 43
Table 12. Summary of Unemployment and Job Creation in the EU in the 1990s


























Belgium 9.5 0.7 1.8 22.1 60.5 3.2 57.3 4.2
Denmark 5.1 -3.2 -1.3 7.4 27.2 2.6 77.5 0.1
Germany 9.4 1.8 5.2 9.8 50.1 -7.1 61.8 -1.3
Greece 11.6 3.1 7.8 32.1 55.7 6.1 56.7 -0.6
Spain 18.8 -2.3 7.5 35.4 51.8 1.2 48.6 4.5
France 11.7 0.4 5.3 26.6 39.6 -0.9 60.1 -1.9
Ireland 7.8 -6.2 -2.8 11.5 56.6 21.1 57.8 6.4
Italy 12.2 1.6 5.2 31.6 66.3 -4.6 51.3 -1.7
Luxembourg 2.8 0.1 1.1 6.9 na 16.4 60.6 1.6
Netherland
s
4.0 -2.4 -3.1 7.8 49.2 9.2 66.7 9.0
Austria 4.7 0.9 2.2 6.6 28.5 2.1 69.9 2.6
Portugal 4.9 -1.0 -2.0 9.8 55.4 -1.9 67.5 4.0
Finland 11.4 -2.8 6.6 23.5 29.6 -8.0 63.9 -11.3
Sweden 8.3 0.7 5.9 16.7 34.2 -10.8 69.5 -10.8
U.K. 6.3 -3.0 -0.6 13.6 38.6 1.5 70.8 4.6
EU 10.0 0.0 3.6 19.5 49.0 -1.7 60.5 -2.1
Source: Tables 3, 5, 6, 8, and 10 and European Commission 1998a: 149-64.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 44
Figure 1. Unemployment Rates in the European Union, the United States, and Japan, 1970-
98
Source: IMF 1999: 88.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 45
Figure 2. The Annual Change in Total Employment and the Rate of Unemployment in
the EU, 1970-96
Source: European Commission 1997a: 13.RSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 46
Figure 3. Number of Persons in Millions Employed in the EU, the U.S., and Japan,
1970-98
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NOTES
1. This paper will appear as a chapter in Nancy Bermeo, ed., Unemployment in the New Europe
(Cambridge University Press, 2000). Earlier versions were presented at conferences or seminars at
Princeton University, Harvard University, and the European University Institute. For their helpful
comments and suggestions, I wish to thank Jens Alber, Sheri Berman, Nancy  Bermeo, Matthew
Canzoneri, Peter Hall, Torben Iversen, Peter Kenen, Sofía Pérez, Martin Rhodes, and Thomas Risse.
2. See European Commission 1998b: 224-53.
3. See Shonfield 1969.
4. European Commission 1998b: 253.
5. See Financial Times, August 11, 1999, p. 2.
6. For discussions of the high levels of unemployment in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, see, among
many, Alogoskoufis et al. 1995, Bean 1994, Bean, Layard, and Nickell, eds. 1987, Benoit-Guilbot and
Gallie 1994, Bentolila and Blanchard 1994, Blanchard, Jimeno et al. 1995, Blanchard and Summers
1986, Blanchard and Wolfers 1999, Dolado and Jimeno 1997, Drèze and Malinvaud 1995, European
Commission 1997a and 1998a, Henry and Snower, eds. 1996, IMF 1999, Layard Nickell, and Jackman
1991 and 1994, Lindbeck 1993, Lindbeck and Snower 1988, OECD 1994a, Rubery, Smith, Fagan, and
Grimshaw 1998, Saint-Paul 1995 and 1996, Snower and de la Dehesa, eds. 1997, and Summers 1990.
7. On December 3, 1998, the ECB engineered a coordinated cut in rates in all of the member states
(except Italy) that were planning to enter the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union on January
1, 1999. The Italian rate remained at 3.5 per cent; the others dropped to 3 per cent. On April 8, 1999,
the ECB reduced its benchmark rate from 3.0 per cent to 2.5 per cent. In the first seven months of
1999, the value of the euro dropped about 14 per cent, from its initial high of $1.1877 on January 4 to a
low of $1.0218 on July 16.
8. As of July, 1999, the rate of unemployment in the eleven members of the euro-zone was 10.2 per
cent, compared to 10.9 per cent a year earlier. See Financial Times, September 21, 1999, p. 2. The
ECB's forecast of unemployment in the euro-zone in 2000 appeared in its monthly report for June,
1999. See the Financial Times, June 16, 1999, p. 2.
9. The quite remarkable drop in Spain reflects an equally remarkable record of job creation over the
four years from 1996 through 1999. During that period, as many new jobs were created in Spain as in
all of the other members of the euro-zone taken together. See Financial Times, May 20, 1999, p. III,
and August 13, 1999, p. 2.
10. Financial Times, September 8, 1999, p. 2.
11. Financial Times, July 1, 1999, p. 1.
12. Greece has announced that it will seek to join the euro-zone in 2001. Denmark and Sweden will
hold referenda on the question of EMU particiaption in 2000 or 2001, and Britain is expected to do
likewise soon after the general election of 2001 or 2002.
13. See European Commission 1998b: 69.
14. In the Spring of 1999, the Commission predicted that the rate of unemployment in the euro- zone
would be 10.4 per cent in 1999 and 9.4 per cent in 2000. The IMF predicted rates of 11.3 per cent in
1999 and 11.0 per cent in 2000, while the OECD predicted that unemployment would be 11.2 per cent
in 1999 and 10.6 per cent in 2000. See Financial Times, "Survey: The European Economy", May 28,
1999, p. 4.
15. For a discussion of the role of exogenous shocks in the rise of European unemployment, see
Blanchard and Wolfers 1999.
16. On French policy under Mitterrand and the Socialist-dominated government in the early 1980s, see
Cameron 1996. On the policy of the Spanish Socialist government that came to power in 1982, seeRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 59
Pérez 1997 and 1999a.
17. See, among many, Cameron 1997, 1998a, and 1998b, Eichengreen 1997, and  Kenen 1992 and
1995.
18. For the most comprehensive treatment to date of gender and  employment, see Rubery, Smith,
Fagan, and Grimshaw 1998.
19. For the best treatment yet published on long-term unemployment in Europe, see Benoit- Guilbot
and Gallie 1994.
20. There appears to be no discernible relationship between the proportion of employees on fixed-term
contracts and the several aspects of unemployment. Spain stands out as exceptional in its high reliance
on such contracts. Fixed-term contracts were introduced in Spain by the Socialist government in order
to induce employers to hire workers by excluding the latter from the rights (e.g., in collective
bargaining) and protections against layoffs (e.g., claims to indemnification payments) that had carried
over from the Franquist era. For discussion of the extent to which (if at all) the use of fixed-term
contracts in Spain contributed to job creation and the reduction of unemployment in the late 1980s and
mid-to- late 1990s, see the chapters by Richards and Polavieja and by Maravall and Fraile in Bermeo
2000.
 We might note that in 1997 public and private sector employer organizations and unions agreed, in
negotiations conducted under the "social protocol" of the Treaty on European Union, to extend certain
rights and benefits to part-time workers in regard to holidays, pension contributions, and dismissal. In
1999, they agreed to extend to fixed-contract workers rights enjoyed by those without fixed-term
contracts, give legal protection to all workers on fixed-term contracts except temporary workers, limit
the use of successive fixed- term contracts, and improve the quality of fixed-term work.  See
Financial Times, February 3, 1998, p. 2; and February 19, 1999, p. 3.
21. On the effects of openness, see Cameron 1978.
22. Economic Commission 1998b: 236.
23. As the Commission (1998a: 29) notes, Figure 7 suggests that aggregate productivity--growth in
GDP per person employed--has consistently increased by a little less than two per cent a year in the
EU, meaning that a growth rate in excess of two per cent a year is needed in order for employment to
increase.
24. That FDI was aggressively solicited by the government's development agency, which offered
subsidies, low taxes, and tax rebates. Much of it was concentrated in the high-technology, export-
oriented sector--e.g., office and computing equipment, electrical engineering, high-end consumer
electronics, pharmaceuticals, etc.--and targeted markets in the EU. By 1997, Irish exports were
equivalent to 80 per cent of GDP, a figure surpassed among the member states of the EU only by
Luxembourg, and Irish exports to the EU constituted more than one-half of the Irish GDP. See IMF
1997b: 62-63 and European Commission 1998b: 134-35.
25. See, among many, Bentolila and Blanchard 1990, Blanchard et al. 1995, Boix 1997, Dolado and
Jimeno 1997, and Pérez 1997 and 1999a. For discussions of the intriguing difference between Spain
and Portugal in regard to unemployment, see Blanchard and Jimeno 1995, Blanchard and Portugal
1998, and Glatzer 1998.
26. In 1994-96, Spain's average annual rate of economic growth was between 2 and 3 per cent. In
1997-99, its average annual rate of growth was between 3.5 and 4 per cent. See European
Commission 1998b: 82.
27. On the re-appearance in the late 1990s of national-level bargaining in Spain, see Pérez (1999b).
While 1997 negotiations took place after the Aznar government had come to power, Pérez notes that
the stage was set for those negotiations by a 1994 agreement between employers and the unions toRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 60
shift some aspects of the regulation of labor markets to the collective bargaining process.
28. See Financial Times, "Survey: Spain", p. IV, June 8, 1998; June 12, 1998, p. 2; and August 3,
1998, p. 13; and "Survey: Spain", May 20, 1999, p. III.
29. See, for example, Casey 1999, Hemerijck and Schludi 1999, Pérez 1999b, the chapter by Rhodes in
Bermeo 2000, Streeck 1998, Van Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996. For a discussion of the earlier forms
of "corporatism", see, among many, Cameron 1984 and Calmfors and Driffill 1988.
30. For a discussion of corporatist arrangements that noted the propensity of national labor movements
to forsake wage militancy in exchange for the attainment and maintenance of near-full employment,
see Cameron 1984.
31. See Financial Times, September 23, 1997, p. 1; and October 23, 1997, p. IV. For a discussion of
the Waasenaar agreement, see Visser and  Hemerijck 1997, as well as de  Beus 1998 and Van
Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996.
32. The "Pact" is designed to keep the budget deficits of the member states participating in the single
currency below 3 per cent of GDP, one of the reference figures stipulated in the Treaty on European
Union for determining whether an "excessive" deficit exists. The "Pact"  stipulates a series of actions,
including the imposition of sanctions, by the Council in the event a member state incurs a budget deficit
in excess of 3 per cent of GDP that is not  "exceptional and temporary". For the terms of the "Pact",
see European Commission 1997b: 41-2, 49-53. For a discussion, see Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998.
33. For earlier discussions of these issues, see Cameron 1997 and 1998b.
34. For a discussion of the transformation now underway in the European financial sector, see
European Central Bank 1999.
35. For discussions of why the member states of the European Community pursued EMU, see, among
many, Cameron 1995, 1997, and 1998b, Dyson 1994, Dyson and Featherstone 1999, Eichengreen 1997,
Kenan 1992 and 1995, and McNamara 1998.
36. See Emerson et al. 1992.
37. Data published by the Commission suggest a very strong inverse relationship over time in the EU
between the ratio of investment to GDP and the level of unemployment, as well as a very close
positive relationship between annual change in Gross Fixed Captial Formation and growth, and a strong
positive relationship between the rate of growth and employment. See European Commission 1998b:
206-7.
38. Thus, the proportion of GDP allocated to gross fixed capital formation in the fifteen current
members of the EU dropped from 23.2 per cent in 1961-70 to 22.8 per cent in 1971-80, 20.1 per cent
in 1981-90, and 19.1 in 1991-97. See European Commission 1998b: 237, 255. For the average rates of
economic growth over that period, see Table 1.
39. The EMU-related reduction in interest rates may be a major factor accounting for the high rates of
growth, and sharp drops in unemployment, in Spain, Ireland, and Portugal. The Italian experience is
anomalous in this regard; rather than stimulating  a resurgence in growth and diminution in
unemployment, the drop in Italian interest rates appears to have had little effect on growth and
employment.
40. See European Communities 1992.
41. See European Commission 1999.
42. See Financial Times, October 15, 1998, p. 2.
43. For a discussion of the negotiations leading up to the formation of the Euro-11, see Cameron 1997,
1998a, and 1998b. See, also, the interview with Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the French finance minister,
in Financial Times, February 12, 1999, p. 18.
44. On numerous occasions in October and November 1998, Lafontaine called upon the ECB to lower
interest rates. The ECB's coordinated reduction in rates to 3 per cent in December muted those callsRSC 99/35 © David R. Cameron 61
for a while, but by February 1999, as growth estimates in Germany for 1999 continued to drop,
Lafontaine renewed his campaign. Not surprisingly, the ECB  refused to lower its benchmark rate.
But at its first meeting after Lafontaine's abrupt  resignation in March, the Governing Council of the
ECB dropped its benchmark from 3 to 2.5 per cent.
45. Resolution of the European Council on growth and employment, Amsterdam, June 16, 1997, in
European Commission (1997b: 42-44).
46. See European Commission (1997b: 42-44).
47. See Financial Times, November 22-23, 1997, p. 2. The Commission had proposed that the
Council adopt an ambitious set of targets--the creation of 12 million new jobs, reduction in the level of
unemployment to 7 per cent, and halving of the rates of long-term and youth unemployment over the
next five years. The leaders did not endorse those  quantitative  targets. For the Commission's
proposals, see Financial Times, October 2, 1997, p. 3, and The Economist, October 4, 1997, pp. 54,
57.
48. The ECB has argued that unemployment in Europe is "overwhelmingly structural" and the IMF
estimates that approximately three-quarters of unemployment in the euro-zone is  structural in nature.
The Commission has taken a more nuanced view, arguing that both structural and cyclical elements
are present. Thus, in the paper it prepared for the  Luxembourg summit, it attributed the current high
level of unemployment primarily to the low rate of economic growth in most of Europe in recent years.
See Financial Times,  October 2, 1997, p. 3, The Economist, October 4, 1997, pp. 54, 57, and IMF
1998: 89.
49. Financial Times, January 19, 1999, p. 3.